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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (16 Dec 68) FOR OT UT 683305

26 December 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st
Cavalry Division (AM), Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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as

Kenneth G. Wickham
KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96490

AVDACS

20 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

THRU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I: OPERATIONS

1. (C) Operations

A. General:

(1) This reporting period covers the conclusion of the completely air supported Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 in the A Shau Valley and the initiation of current offensive operations being conducted in Operation Jeb Stuart III. In each of these operations, although the mission and terrain varied greatly, the applied tactics, concepts and doctrine of the 1 ACD again proved successful. Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216, a reconnaissance in force operation, proved to the enemy that he has no "safe havens" in South Vietnam. The massive air assault into the A Shau Valley, despite modern anti-aircraft defenses, proved once again that the 1st Air Cavalry Division can develop major forces in critical enemy areas entirely supported by aerial resupply and evacuation.

(2) The flexibility of the 1 ACD was again demonstrated as Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 terminated and Operation Jeb Stuart III began. Deploying into Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces in mid May, the 1 ACD immediately initiated operations to deny the enemy rice from the spring rice harvest while at the same time air assaulting deep into his base areas causing him to abandon the headquarters complex, hospitals, rest areas and training sites that he had previously considered secure. Gorden and search, "Swooper" operations and night ambushes, all conducted in close coordination with ARVN and local RF and PF forces, became the order of the day on the coastal plain and rice growing areas, as 8,878 tons of rice were harvested and secured in government warehouses during the harvest period.

(3) During the reporting period, Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 was officially terminated at 171100H August 1968. The final results were:

Friendly: US Army - 69 KIA, 530 WIA, 47 MIA, 21 A/C destroyed.
ARVN - 3 KIA, 12 WIA.

Enemy: (NVA/VC) - 341/84 KIA, 2/1 PW's, 4/3 RTN's, 2,371 IWC, 31 CSWC, 42,347 lg cal rds, 1,521 mines/grenades, 168,897 SA ammo (SA and 12.7mm) 7k, 805 lbs food stores, 13 Anti-aircraft wps capt. Vehicles captured: 2 Bull-dozers, 73 wheeled, 3 tracked, 1 tank; Misc: 31 Flamethrowers, 36 mine de-

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(4) Operation Jeb Stuart III commenced at 171100H May 1968 in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. This operation continues into the next reporting period.

B. 1st Brigade Operations:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period the Brigade was tactically deployed in the A Shau Valley with its headquarters at LZ Stallion (YD 384003). The three battalions of the brigade conducted extensive reconnaissance in force operations throughout the southern A Shau Valley uncovering many enemy cache sites.

(2) On 15 May the Brigade initiated redeployment into the present Jeb Stuart III AO as two battalions of Sktroopers were airlifted out of the A Shau Valley and redeployed in the vicinity of Quang Tri. By 16 May all elements of the Brigade had been airlifted out of the valley and initiated combat operations in the vicinity of LZ's Betty and Sharon, the Ba Long Valley and Base Area 101. Special emphasis during Operation Jeb Stuart III has been placed on operations in close coordination with the 1st ARVN Regiment north and northeast of Quang Tri City. Cordon and search and swooper operations utilizing local RF and PF forces were successfully employed to deny the enemy the vital rice he needed from the spring rice harvest. Psychological warfare and civil affairs teams were habitually employed to support operations in populated areas during daylight hours. Search and clear operations were conducted throughout the AO to locate the enemy and capture or destroy him. At night the Brigade used hunter-killer teams and night ambushes to seek out the enemy and interdict his movement on trails and waterways.

(3) On 22 May the Brigade air assaulted C 1/8 Cav deep into Base Area 101 and established LZ Anne (YD 290403). By the evening of 22 May the 1-8 Cav Bn CP and remaining companies of the Bn had been airlifted into LZ Anne and initiated extensive search and clear operations against the enemy. On 6 June C 1/12 air assaulted still deeper into the Base Area 101 and established LZ Barbara (YD 328335). The addition of these two LZ's deep within the enemy's base areas enabled the 1st Brigade to effectively interdict the enemy's lines of communication leading into Quang Tri City and the rich rice producing coastal plains northeast of Quang Tri.

C. 2d Brigade Operations:

(1) Until 17 May the 2d Brigade (-) remained OPCON to the 3d Marine Division participating in two 3d Marine Division operations (Scotland II, 1-7 May and Concordia Square, 8-17 May) and accounted for a total of 376 enemy killed. On 17 May the Bde (-) deployed back to the Jeb Stuart III AO. On returning OPCON to the 1 ACD, the Brigade assumed responsibility for LZ Jane, LZ Hardcore, Wunder Beach, Skyline Ave, and a portion of QL-1. The 2d Brigade also assumed OPCON of the 2/12 Cav which had been OPCON to the 1 ACD during Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216. The 3-5 Armored Cav Squadron with its headquarters at Wunder Beach was also placed OPCON to the 2d Bde.

(2) Operations during the months of May and June were characterized by light enemy contact as emphasis was placed on rice denial operations. Numerous combined operations were conducted with RF and PF forces from Huong Dien, Hai Lang and Phong Dien Districts. These operations were very successful in denying the enemy much needed rice supplies. Daily cordon and search operations forced the enemy to operate in platoon or smaller size forces in order to avoid detection. Night ambushes and hunter teams designed to detect small unit movements were very successful in interdicting the movement of the enemy as he unsuccessfully attempted to move into the rice producing areas. Operations for the month of July were also characterized by light enemy contact

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as the emphasis is shifted from rice denial to search and clear operations in Base Area 101 and south of the base areas. The largest contact during the reporting period occurred on 27-30 June when the 814th NVA Bn was trapped in the village of Binh An (vic YD 4063) by 3/5 Arm Cav Sgdn. The two day contact involving the 3/5 Armored Cav with D Trp 1/9 Cav, D Co 1/5 Cav and C Co 2/5 Cav resulted in 233 NVA killed, 44 PW's, 72 S/A and 9 C/S weapons captured.

(3) On 28 June, the 2d Brigade received OPCON of the 2/1 Cav Bn and assumed responsibility for security of LZ Barbara from the 1st Bde. With the additional Bn, 2d Brigade expanded operations into Base Area 101, and although meeting only light enemy resistance they did uncover several enemy caches and successfully disrupted the enemy use of the Base Area. On 19 July, LZ Carol was established in the extreme southern portion of the Brigade AO by rappelling skytroopers into the site of recent air strikes. By the evening of 19 July, two companies of the 2/8 Cav had been airlifted into the LZ and initiated combat operations in the vicinity of the LZ. For the remainder of the reporting period, the Brigade continued to emphasize operations in BA 101 and south of the base in the vicinity of LZ Carol. Normal cordon and search operations on the coastal plains and search and clear operations in the Piedmont region vicinity of LZ Jane and along QL-1 were also conducted.

D. 3d Brigade Operations:

(1) During the period 1-9 May, the Bde continued reconnaissance in force operations in the A Shau Valley with light to moderate enemy resistance. Major NVA logistical and combat support bases continued to be uncovered as the Garry Owen Brigade moved freely throughout the northern portion of the valley. On 10 May the Brigade HQ and two Bn's were airlifted from the A Shau Valley to Camp Evans followed the next day by the remaining infantry Bn and support elements. The period 12-17 May found the Bns of the Brigade redeploying into the present Jeb Stuart III AO as LZ's Jack and Jeanne were reopened and the brigade assumed responsibility for security of Camp Evans from the 196th Light Infantry Brigade which had been OPCON to the 1 ACD during Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216. Once redeployed into the Jeb Stuart AO, the Brigade immediately initiated aggressive offensive operations designed to find, fix, and destroy or capture the enemy on the coastal plain and in BA 114. Rice denial operations were emphasized as elements of the Brigade working closely with local RF and PF forces captured 49.5 tons of rice during the months of May and June. On 23 May, the 2/12 Cav was placed OPCON to the Brigade and air assaulted deep into Base Area 114 to establish LZ Meredith (YD 473207). LZ Meredith was closed on 5 June and LZ Mooney (YD 445193) was opened. The establishment of these LZ's represented the deepest penetration the 1 ACD had made into Base Area 114 and paved the way for extensive operations by both US and ARVN forces that were to continue through the reporting period. In the vicinity of Camp Evans, search and clear operations, establishment of outposts on high ground overlooking the camp and extensive night ambush/patrolling operations halted the enemy rocket attacks on Camp Evans that had increased in both frequency and intensity in early and mid May. Throughout the month of June, rice denial operations coupled with night ambushes and extensive patrolling governed the activities of the Brigade on the coastal plains, while two Bn's continued to operate in Base Area 114 forcing the enemy to abandon his caches and supply points.

(2) On 10 July, the 2/12 Cav was returned OPCON to the 2d Bde and the 2/5 Cav was placed OPCON to the Brigade and operated on the coastal plains in the vicinity of the "Graveyard" and "The Street Without Jov." This operation,

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designed to destroy the numerous bunkers and booby traps in the area while at the same time uncovering suspected enemy cache sites, proved very successful. As of the end of the reporting period, approximately 50 per cent of the land area of 3000 acres had been cleared. On 17 July, LZ Maureen (YD 428119) was established south of BA 114. This LZ allowed the Garry Owen Brigade to operate to the extreme southern boundary of the 1 ACD AO while at the same time supporting the 101st ACD with 155mm artillery in the A Shau Valley. As the reporting period closed, Operation Jeb Stuart III continued. "Rome Flow" and extensive search and clear operations continued along the street and in the vicinity of Camp Evans while two battalions of the Brigade continued to uncover large enemy caches and make sporadic contact with the enemy in and around BA 114.

E. 196th Light Infantry Brigade Operations:

The 196 LIB was placed OPCON to 1 ACD on 18 April to provide security for Camp Evans and was designated PCV Reserve Brigade. (1-14 May 1968) On 1 May 1968 the 3/21st Infantry Bn was released OPCON from the Brigade, placed OPCON 3d Marine Division and deployed in the vicinity of Dong Ha. The Brigade (-) continued to provide security for Camp Evans and conduct combat operations in the vicinity of Camp Evans and along QL-1. Enemy contact remained light. On 6 May the 2/1 Infantry Battalion was released OPCON from the Brigade, and placed OPCON 101st Airborne Division and deployed to LZ Nola in the 101st Airborne Div AO. Upon extraction of the 3d Brigade 1 ACD from the A Shau Valley on 11 May, the 196 LIB (-) was relieved from security of Camp Evans and commenced redeployment back to the Americal Division AO on 13 May. The last elements departed Camp Evans on 14 May; the 3/21 Inf and 2/1 Inf deployed directly from Dong Ha and LZ Nola. OPCON of the 196th LIB terminated on 141630H May 1968.

F. 3d ARVN Regiment Operations:

(1) On 1 May the 2/1 ARVN Bn and the Regiment's DS Arty Battery airlifted to LZ Lucy in the A Shau Valley. The arrival of the 2/1 Bn completed the insertion of the Regiment into the valley. Utilizing LZ Lucy as the Regimental CP and fire support base, the Regiment commenced a two-Bn attack SE from LZ Lucy astride the Rao Lao River. The ARVN attack met only light enemy resistance, however, several significant supply caches were uncovered. By 7 May, the attack had advanced to the limits of its supporting artillery. In order to continue the attack to the SE to the old A Shau SF Camp, LZ Lillian (YD 439868) was established. Supported by 1 ACD aircraft the supporting artillery of the Regiment was airlifted to LZ Lillian and the attack continued. By 9 May, all ARVN objectives had been secured, and on 10-11 May, the Regiment supported by 1 ACD aircraft was extracted from the valley and airlifted back to Quang Tri and PK-17.

(2) By 18 May, the 3d ARVN Regiment was again operating with the FIRST TEA. The Regiment initiated combined operations in coordination and close cooperation with the 1 ACD air assaulting 2-1 ARVN Battalion OPCON into Base Area 114 and establishing LZ Miguel (YD 489198). Prior to nightfall of the same day, the Regimental CP and one ARVN artillery battery had also closed the LZ. On 19 May, two additional ARVN Battalions were committed into the Jeb Stuart III AO as the 1/3 ARVN Battalion air assaulted to LZ Jose (YD 540185) (East of BA 114) and the 2/3 ARVN Battalion was airlifted to the same LZ. From LZ Jose both Bn's initiated attacks to the southwest into Base Area 114.

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(3) From 19 May to the end of the reporting period the Regiment has conducted continuous operations in BA 114. Enemy contact ranged from light to heavy during the reporting period as the Regiment pressed its search for the enemy and his tactical and supply headquarters. Continuous close cooperation and coordination between the 3d Regiment and the 3d Bde 1 ACD was instrumental in the success of operations in BA 114.

G. 1-9 Cavalry Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the squadron concluded Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 and initiated Operation Jeb Stuart III. During the period 1-17 May, the squadron was involved in extensive reconnaissance and surveillance operations in the A Shau Valley and continued to provide reconnaissance and surveillance for the 196th LIR in the vic of Camp Evans. Through the use of extensive scouting, both air and ground, the squadron proved an invaluable asset to the conduct of the operation and was instrumental in its successful completion. At the conclusion of the operation the squadron conducted extensive deception and denial operations in the southern and northern ends of the valley. These operations contributed to the successful extraction of 1 ACD and 3d ARVN Regt forces from the valley upon termination of the operation.

(2) As Operation Jeb Stuart III commenced, the Air Cavalry Troops of the squadron again initiated extensive reconnaissance and surveillance of the AO and provided support to the brigades on a mission basis. The squadron operated in general support during Operation Jeb Stuart III; however, support to the brigades on a mission basis has been habitually provided by A Troop to the 1st Bde, B Troop to the 3d Bde and C Troop to the 2d Bde. All troops continued to conduct intensive first and last light reconnaissance around Camp Evans, LZ's Betty and Sharon, and LZ Jane and the Wunder Beach Complex. Except for special operations, the emphasis of reconnaissance has been directed in Base Areas 101/114, the Ba Long Valley and the coastal plains. Mortar patrols, bomb damage assessments and insertion of the Troops' organic infantry platoons into known or suspected enemy locations continued to be routine missions always successfully performed by the 1-9 Cav.

(3) D Troop, the ground reconnaissance troop of the squadron, performed a wide variety of missions during the reporting period. During the closing days of Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216, the troop continued to provide one dismounted platoon for security of Signal Hill (YD 407036). Also during the operation, D Troop provided anti-tank support to the 3d ARVN Regiment in the vicinity of Ta Bat and LZ Lillian in the A Shau Valley with six 106mm recoilless rifle sections. Additionally, the 1st Bde was supported in its ground reconnaissance and security of LZ Stallion by a heavy mounted scout team. After the conclusion of Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216, D Troop concentrated its efforts on search and clear operations throughout the Jeb Stuart III AO. Through the remainder of the reporting period, the troop was placed OPCON to different elements of the 1 ACD in order to fully utilize the reconnaissance potential of the unit. The largest single contact in Operation Jeb Stuart III occurred when D Troop working OPCON to 3/5 Armored Cav made contact with the 814th NVA Bn in the vicinity of YD 403633. This contact developed into a Squadron (+) operation in which D Troop was credited with killing 61 enemy.

(4) Enemy contact for all elements of the squadron can best be describe as light throughout Operation Jeb Stuart III. Besides the normal reconnaissance and surveillance missions performed by the air cavalry troops, special missions such as "sniffer" and night hunter killer operations were also

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conducted. These operations have proven to be a valuable intelligence source and extremely effective in denying the enemy use of vital trail and waterway networks.

(5) On 30 July, B Troop was released OPCON 1/9 Cav Squadron and placed 101st ACD participating in Operation SOMERSET PLAIN in the A Shau Valley. On 31 July, A Troop was also released OPCON 1-9 Cav and placed OPCON 1st Marine Division for operations in the vicinity of Da Nang.

H. Combat Support Elements Operations:

(1) Division Artillery submitted by separate report.

(2) 11th Aviation Group:

a. During the reporting period the Group supported the troops of the 1 ACD in both Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 and Operation Jeb Stuart III. In Operation Delaware, the 11th Aviation Group continued to operate from Camp Evans. A tactical CP was not established in the A Shau Valley. During the first part of May, the ground troops of the 1 ACD were concentrating reconnaissance in force operations in their respective AO's. Since the AO's were relatively small, large scale airlifts within the valley were not required. During the period, priority of aviation support was directed toward logistical requirements. On 10 May, the Division (-) began extraction from the A Shau Valley. Utilizing a combination of Air Force and organic aircraft the entire Division (-) plus the 3d ARVN Regiment was able to extract from the valley in 7 days. During the period 10-16 May the following extraction sorties were flown by the organic aviation assets of the 1 ACD: UH-1H - 813, CH-47 - 750 and CH-54 - 136.

b. Operation Jeb Stuart III entailed the double missions of rice denial operations on the coastal plain and search and destroy operations in BA 101 and 114. Operations of the Group during this period were characterized by local company and platoon sized combat assaults in each of the Brigade AO's and the standard logistical missions to support the Battalions. In addition, the Group provided the airlift for the 3d ARVN Regiment into BA 114 and continued throughout the reporting period to support the Regiment on a mission basis. At 191925H May, Camp Evans was hit by twelve 122mm rockets. One rocket hit the ASP area and initiated a chain of sympathetic detonations which lasted for over 10 hours and resulted in the destruction of the ASP. Concussion and shrapnel caused considerable damage to aircraft and equipment of the 227th AHB; Company C, 228th ASHB; and the 11th GS Company. Battle damage resulted in the following total aircraft hit-non-flyable: 11th GS Company: 1 UH1D, 1 U6A and 5 UH1H; 227th AHB: 9 UH1B/C and 37 UH1H; Co C 228th ASHB: 6 CH-47A and 10 CH-47B. The lift requirements for Operation Jeb Stuart III were considerably less than for Operation Delaware, consequently the aircraft loss did not seriously curtail operations. Two weeks after the attack, aircraft availability was comparable to the rate prior to the attack. The Group continued to support FOB #3 at Khe Sanh until 3 July when support shifted to FOB #4 at Da Nang.

(3) 13th Signal Battalion:

a. During the reporting period the Battalion provided communication support to the Division for Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 and Jeb Stuart III. During Operation Delaware, with one completed installment of a radio relay site at Signal Hill, there were no significant communications problems encountered. At the Division TAC CP at LZ Stallion the Bn installed the following communications:

1. FM Radio (secure and non-secure) to all major subordinate commands.

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2 AM Radio (Voice and secure teletype) to all major subordinate commands.

2 VHF Telephone communications to the two committed brigades (1st and 3d), 3d ARVN Regiment, and Camp Evans.

4 Local switchboard and telephone service at LZ Stallion. During the phased withdrawal from the A Shau Valley, all signal personnel and equipment were extracted to the Jeb Stuart III AO. During Operation Jeb Stuart III, the tactical situation has not heavily committed the Signal Battalion resources although additional communications were provided to the 1st Bde 1 ACD as follows:

(a) One AN/TRC 24, 12 channel system from Camp Evans to LZ Betty.
(b) One MRC 112, 4 channel system (voice TT) from LZ Betty to Quang Tri.

(c) One switchboard SB-86 with capabilities for 60 land lines.
b. Special communications requirements during the period were met by providing the following support:

1 Secure radio-teletype and AM voice (AN/VSC-2)

- (a) 1st ACD elements at Red Beach
- (b) 1st ACD elements at Phu Bai
- (c) 1st ACD LNO at Saigon
- (d) 1st ACD elements at An Khe

2 FM radio

- (a) Airborne relay at Marble Mountain, Da Nang
- (b) NCS station for two Division Command FM Radio nets

3 Communications Center Circuits for

- (a) Hq Provisional Corps, Vietnam
- (b) Phu Bai Army area communications center
- (c) Major subordinate units

(4) 8th Engineer Battalion:

a. During the reporting period, all elements of the Bn supported the 1 ACD for the final phase of Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 and throughout Operation Jeb Stuart III. On 3 May the A Luoi airstrip, originally rehabilitated to accommodate C7A and C-123 traffic, was expanded to 3100 ft for C-130 traffic, the airstrip was maintained at this length through 11 May when daily thunderstorms with heavy rain forced closing of the strip. During the latter portion of Operation Delaware, the Battalion played a major role in the activation of the area denial plan for the A Shau Valley. Specific details concerning the denial plan are available in the 1 ACD combat after action report dated 11 July 1968 Delaware/Lam Son 216. Operations in the Jeb Stuart III AO continued to emphasize the minesweeps of QL-1, Skyking Ave, and the access roads to LZ's Betty, Sharon, Jane, and Camp Evans. Direct support was provided to the maneuver battalions in their conduct of offensive operations and in the opening of new LZ's and firebases. Work continued on the major LZ's (Sharon, Jane and Camp Evans) in the development of more extensive perimeter defenses, additional facilities, perimeter operations and maintenance of the C-130 airstrip at Camp Evans. Construction of a new major LZ (Nancy, YD 4440) was initiated on 12 July 1968. As of 31 July, 13,000 (+) meters of tactical wire have been erected around the future site of the 2d Brigade HQ. Elements of the US Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 4 and the 14th Engineer Battalion provided general engineer support to the 1 ACD throughout the reporting period.

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2. Discussion and Analysis of Major Operations:(C)

A. General:

(1) During the reporting period, attached and supporting units of the 1 ACD concluded Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 (19 April-17 May 1968) and initiated Operation Jeb Stuart III on 17 May 1968.

(2) During the latter stages of Operation Delaware, reconnaissance in force operations continued to uncover large enemy caches in the A Shau Valley while the enemy offered only token light resistance. By 16 May, all Allied forces had withdrawn from the valley and the area denial plan had been implemented. Operation Delaware was a daring and highly successful offensive thrust into the primary enemy logistical complex for the northern half of South Vietnam. The equipment and supplies captured and/or destroyed will impede NVA operations in the ICTZ. The roads and bridges destroyed in the area, plus the nuisance mine fields will measurably hamper infiltration through the valley. The psychological effect of the operation on the enemy cannot be determined; however, the enemy will certainly realize that he can no longer consider the A Shau Valley as a totally secure supply complex.

(3) At 171100H May, Operation Jeb Stuart III commenced. The 1 ACD initiated operations to accomplish its two-fold mission of rice denial and offensive operations in Base Areas 101 and 114. On the coastal plain, rice denial operations were conducted in conjunction with ARVN Forces to insure that rice from the spring harvest was withheld from the enemy. In Base Area 101, combat operations in search of enemy forces were initiated; while in Base Area 114, elements of the FIRST TEAM and 3d ARVN Regiment conducted operations over rugged terrain in search of enemy forces and installations. At the conclusion of the spring rice harvest, emphasis shifted to even more intensified operations in the vicinity of the Base Areas. Elements from all Brigades air assaulted deep into south of the base areas establishing new LZ's and expanding search and destroy operations designed to kill or capture the enemy. On 1 July, Rome Flow equipment moved into the 2/7 Cav AO to initiate a clearing operation that continues into the next reporting period. This operation was designed to destroy a known major bunker and tunnel complex in the vicinity of the "Graveyard" and the "Street without Joy". Two major enemy contacts were made during the reporting period. The first occurred on 27-30 June when the 314th NVA Battalion was trapped in the village of Binh An (YD 4063) by elements of the 2d Bde. Results of the contact were 233 NVA killed, 44 PW's, 76 small arms and 9 crew served weapons captured. The 2d major contact occurred on the morning of 3 July when the 3d ARVN Regiment CP at LZ Miguel was attacked by an estimated NVA Battalion. The ARVN Bn supported by 1 ACD tube artillery, ARA and gunships successfully defended the LZ accounting for 66 NVA killed and 17 individual and 3 crew served weapons captured. With the exception of these contacts, only light to moderate enemy resistance has been encountered as the enemy was driven from his headquarters and logistical complexes. The 1 ACD received a new commander on 15 July 1968 when BG Richard L Irby assumed command from MG John J Tolson III.

B. Significant actions occurring in the Delaware/Lam Son 216 and Jeb Stuart III AO's during the reporting period.

(1) 1 May: D 1/8 made contact with an estimated NVA squad at YD 367014. D Co returned fire with small arms and artillery resulting in eleven secondary explosions and 4 NVA killed.

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(2) 2 May: Near LZ Goodman, 2/7 Cav found two 37mm AA guns in good condition. Along with the abandoned guns, the unit found 500 rds of 37mm ammo, several replicas of US fighter A/C and 2 NVA jackets.

(3) 3 May: Elements of the 3d Brigade captured 3 more 37mm AA guns bringing the total to twelve for the operation.

(4) 4 May: At 1635H, B 2/8 Cav began receiving A/W fire from enemy in 6 bunkers at YD 244017. B 2/8 engaged the enemy with artillery resulting in ten NVA killed.

(5) 6 May: LZ Tiger received fire from R-40 and 122mm rockets, 37mm AA guns, recoilless rifles, 82mm mortars and possibly one tank. Results were 1 US KIA and 10 WIA. Artillery, ARA, and gunships engaged the area with negative enemy assessment.

(6) 12 May: While on a screening mission for the 1st Rde, A Trp, 1/9 Cav found a rocket cache vicinity YD 243667. Ground troops moved to the area and found a total of 50 122mm rockets.

(7) 15 May: During a last light reconnaissance at YD 360442, an ARA team fired rockets to open the canopy and found an antenna with heavy wires leading to a large bunker complex. Air strikes were put into the area causing four large secondary explosions and one large fire. One NVA body was seen from the air and a sophisticated bunker complex was destroyed.

(8) 18 May: B 2/7 Cav found 23,000 pounds of rice which was evacuated to Phong Dien District HQ.

(9) 19 May: At 1925H Camp Evans received twelve rounds of enemy 122mm rocket fire. One round started a fire in the ammo storage area that caused massive secondary explosions throughout the night; damage to organic aircraft was heavy and the ASP was destroyed.

(10) 19 May: B 2/7 Cav engaged an estimated NVA platoon at YD 607393 resulting in 9 NVA killed.

(11) 20 May: B 2/7 Cav received fire from an estimated enemy platoon at YD 613393. Artillery, ARA and air strikes engaged the area resulting in 14 enemy killed.

(12) 24 May: D 2/8 Cav received automatic weapons fire from 4 bunkers at YD 323384 resulting in one US KIA and 1 US WIA. D Co engaged the area with small arms, artillery and airstrikes. In a sweep of the battle area they found numerous items of equipment and eleven 122mm rockets.

(13) 28 May: At 1030H, A Trp 3/5 Arm Cav made contact with an estimated NVA battalion at YD 430595. 1st Rde elements were immediately committed into the contact area. The contact continued until 1200H 30 May, resulting in 106 enemy killed, 20 POW's, 5 crew and 26 individual weapons captured.

(14) 30 May: 2/7 Cav operating on the coastal plains north of Camp Evans picked up 17 detainees who were classified as 7 VC, 7 CN's and 3 IC.

(15) 2 June: At 1459H, C 2/5 Cav received small arms fire from a bunker at YD 493435, returned fire resulted in 4 VC killed.

(16) 4 June: At 1028H, B 1/9 Cav observed 10 enemy with weapons and web gear at YD 604385, engaged with rockets and W's resulting in 9 VC killed.

(17) 4 June: Elements of D 1/9 working with two PF platoons from Phong Dien Dist HQ had sporadic contact throughout the day vic YD 6032 resulting in 26 enemy killed and no loss to friendly troops.

(18) 5 June: B 1/77 Art F0 observed several enemy in the open, called in artillery, results 8 NVA killed.

(19) 7 June: At 1400H, A 1/12 Cav found a large cache at YD 329341 consisting of 300 82mm mortar rounds, 200 B-40 rocket rounds, 300 B-41 rocket rounds, 50 57mm RR rounds, 5000 AK-47 rounds, 115 lbs of TNT and 5 IM's.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

(20) 9 June: A 1/12 vic YD 329341 found 2 RPD LMG's, 1 82mm mortar, 13 SMG's, 4 M-1 rifles, 2 carbines, 11 bolt action rifles, 73 82mm mortar rds, 110 B-40 rkt rounds, 5000 SA rds and 1 57mm RR rd. At 1230H, B 2/7 Cav observed 5 enemy with weapons vic YD 519470, resulting in 4 enemy killed.

(21) 11 June: At 0805H, 2/3 ARVN made contact with an unknown size enemy force vic YD 497172, receiving S/A and A/W fire. 2/3 ARVN returned fire with organic wps, artillery and called in A/S's. Contact was sporadic throughout the day. At 1940H 2/3 ARVN received approximately 50 rds of 60mm mortar. All contact broken at 1945H resulting in 4 ARVN KIA, 19 ARVN WTA (18 evac), 1 US advisor WIA, 1 VC KIA; in same location 2/3 ARVN uncovered enemy cache consisting of 75 B-40 rocket rds, 100 lbs of TNT, 200 grenades and 20,000 rds of S/A ammo.

(22) 12 June: At 0950H, A 1/12 Cav rec SA fire vic YD 338346. Returned fire and called in ARA resulting in 4 NVA killed and 1 NVA POW. At 0900H, 2/3 ARVN made contact with an estimated NVA Battalion, (-) vic YD 499169. Contact continued until 1800H resulting in 1 ARVN KIA, 2 ARVN WTA, 11 NVA killed, 5 individual and 1 crew served weapon captured. A 2/12 discovered what appeared to be the headquarters for the QUE TET operations vic YD 477120. Approximately 1000 maps and several pounds of documents were found in 8 large tunnels.

(23) 13 June: At 0045H, E 1/8 Cav ambush element engaged 4 enemy vic YD 322455, resulting in 3 VC killed, 1 VC PW.

(24) 14 June: At 2315H, 2d Bde night hunter killer team observed 2 boats, engaged; results 2 boats destroyed, 5 VC killed. At 1040H, 2/3 ARVN found what appeared to be a major enemy headquarters complex vic YD 492174. Enemy had evacuated the area leaving behind approximately 1000 B-40 and B-41 rocket rds, 100 claymore mines, 100 NVA uniforms, 26 individual weapons, 30,000 rds of SA ammo, and two open graves containing 29 NVA bodies.

(25) 15 June: At 1525H, C 2/8 Cav rec heavy S/A fire vic YD 352362, returned fire resulted in 7 NVA killed.

(26) 17 June: At 2200H, B 2/5 ambush element engaged several enemy on trails, vic YD 418480, YD 418488, resulting in 3 enemy killed. At 1429H, A 1/9 observed several enemy on trail vic YD 324404, engaged resulting in 5 NVA killed.

(27) 18 June: At 0610H, Camp Evans received 7 122mm rockets, 2 inside, 5 outside perimeter resulting in light damage to A/C, no casualties. ARA and B 1/9 Cav gunships engaged suspected enemy firing positions resulting in 5 NVA killed. Ground elements air assaulted into the area finding two 122mm rockets at YD 513237.

(28) 19 June: At 1740H, aerial observer from 1/30 Artv observed an estimated 2 companies of NVA in the open vic YD 366249. Engaged with artillery and air strikes resulting in 25 NVA killed.

(29) 21 June: C 1/7 Cav found a large cache site consisting primarily of signal equipment vic YD 418201. The most significant items captured were: five portable radios, one thirty-line switchboard, two PRC-10 radios, two AM radios, and 19 boxes of miscellaneous parts for electronic and communications equipment.

(30) 24 June: At 0900H, B 1/12 Cav engaged 5 enemy, results 3 NVA killed. At 1730H, D 2/5 engaged 3 enemy with weapons vic YD 424393, resulting in 3 NVA killed and 3 IWC.

(31) 25 June: At 1140H, 2/1 ARVN Bn made contact with estimated enemy platoon vic YD 483171 resulting in 13 NVA killed, ten 122mm rockets captured. D 2/5 Cav conducted cordon and search with local RF/PF forces vic YD 510420 resulting in six VC killed, 2 PW, 8 individual and 1 crew served wpn captured.

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(32) 27 June: At 1905H, C 3/5 Arm Cav and D 1/9 Cav rec sniper fire and RPG rds vic YD 405633. Contact continued through 20 June, as A 3/5 Arm Cav, B 3/5 Arm Cav, D 1/5 Cav and C 2/5 Cav joined the original companies in effectively cordoning the village of Binh An. Results of the contact were: 233 NVA killed, 44 NVA POW, 76 IWC, 9 CSWC.

(33) 2 July: At 1050H, B 2/9 Cav observed 6-8 enemy vic YD 301335, engaged with small arms and called in gunships, resulting in 3 NVA killed & 2 IWC.

(34) 3 July: At 0300H, 2/3 ARVN at LZ Miguel received 60 rounds of 82mm and 60mm mortar in conjunction with enemy Bn size ground attack. Contact continued until 0400H as 2/3 ARVN successfully defended the LZ resulting in 66 NVA killed, 17 individual and 3 crew served weapons captured. In conjunction with the attack on LZ Miguel, at 0300, Camp Evans received 3 120mm rockets, LZ Helen 26 82mm mortar rds and LZ Mooney received 3 60 mm mortar rds.

(35) 4 July: Elements of the 3d Bde operating on the coastal plain north of Camp Evans uncovered approximately 29 tons of hidden enemy rice. Rice was evacuated to local district HQ's.

(36) 6 July: At 1555H, D 2/12 Cav surprised 4 enemy preparing ambush site vic YD 389261, exchanged fire resulting in 4 US KIA, 3 NVA KIA and 1 NVA captured.

(37) 7 July: At 1440H, B 1/5 Cav observed two enemy who threw satchel charges vic YD 358372. At the same time B Co began receiving small arms fire, B Co called in arty and air strikes resulting in 12 NVA killed. At 1230H, LRRP Tm 1D, observed 5-7 enemy vic YD 370201. 1/9 Cav and ARA engaged enemy resulting in 3 NVA killed.

(38) 8 June: At 1910H, B 1/5 Cav ambush element engaged 5 enemy vic YD 412396, results 3 NVA killed. At 1905H, C 1/9 Cav observed 4 enemy evading, engaged, results 4 VC killed.

(39) 9 June: At 1806H, C 1/9 Cav observed 5 enemy, engaged, results 4 NVA killed.

(40) 12 July: At 1650H, B 1/5 Cav observed 8 enemy SW of their location vic YD 368408, engaged with arty and organics, results 3 NVA killed.

(41) 13 July: At 1108H, LRRP Tm 1E observed movement on three sides of their position vic YD 389387. Called in 1/9 Cav gunships and ARA who engaged the area resulting in 14 NVA killed.

(42) 14 July: 3/3 ARVN found enemy cache site vic YD 509192, consisting of following items: 10 82mm mortar rds, 1000 rds 7-40 rockets, 53 boxes 50 cal ammo, 14,000 rds AK-47 ammo, 20 Chicom claymore mines and 1 3.5 RL (US).

(43) 15 July: At 1130H, D 2/8 Cav observed and engaged 7 enemy resulting in 2 NVA killed. At 1125H, C 5/7 Cav observed and engaged 5 enemy evading vic YD 300116, resulting in 5 NVA killed.

(44) 16 July: At 1220H, 3d Bde scouts observed 4 enemy evading into bunkers vic YD 618386, engaged area resulting in 3 NVA killed.

(45) 20 July: At 0925H, C 2/8 Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force vic YD 348194, resulting in 1 US KIA, 3 NVA killed.

(46) 23 July: At 1125H, B 2/12 Cav observed and engaged 3 enemy vic YD 303344, resulting in 3 NVA killed.

(47) 24 July: At 0810H, B 2/8 Cav observed 3-4 enemy evading vic YD 337205, engaged with small arms, enemy returned fire, resulting in 6 US KIA, 8 US KIA & 11 NVA killed. B 2/5 Cav found an ammo wps cache vic YD 405133, consisting of 75 8-40 rockets, 535 82mm mortar rds, 37 AT mines, 290 60mm mortar rds, 89,760 AK-47 rds, 10 57mm RR rds, 75 lbs explosives and 11 IWC.

(48) 26 July: At 1400H, C 2/12 Cav observed and engaged 6 NVA vic YD 366364, results 2 NVA killed.

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(49) 30 July: At 1353H, A 2/7 Cav received S/A fire from 3 enemy in bunker vic YD 533450, engaged bunker resulting in 3 VC killed. PF's from Phong Dien District HQ's working with A 2/7 Cav engaged and killed 7 VC vic YD 537456. At 1621H, C 1/9 Cav observed and engaged 4 NVA vic YD 377301, results 4 NVA killed.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

SECTION II LESSONS LEARNED

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

A. Marking Panels.

(1) OBSERVATION: Marking friendly positions with smoke grenades can draw indirect enemy fire.

(2) EVALUATION: During the operation, the enemy possessed the capability of employing accurate indirect fire on friendly positions. If smoke grenades were used to mark friendly locations for aircraft, the enemy could use it as a target for artillery. It was found that the use of marker panels served to mark friendly positions as well as smoke grenades without drawing artillery fire. When US issue panels were not available, field expedient methods were used.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: When the enemy has the capability to deliver accurate indirect fire, marker panels should be used to mark friendly locations instead of smoke grenades.

B. Runway Rehabilitation Estimates:

(1) OBSERVATION: The average size of craters from B-52 strikes in a silty clay soil was 50-60' in diameter and .5'-20' deep.

(2) EVALUATION: Crater size is critical in obtaining an engineer work estimate for runway rehabilitation. Operation DELAWARE presented the unique problem of no experience on sizes of craters to expect and no possibility of a ground reconnaissance. Therefore, estimates for engineer work were based primarily on photo interpretation using a stereo-meter.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That a record be maintained of crater sizes according to type of soil and type of ordnance utilized.

C. Air Movement Control Aircraft.

(1) OBSERVATION: During Operation DELAWARE, extensive aircraft traffic and weather conditions dictated the need for a control aircraft.

(2) EVALUATION: Normally, a U-6A was used for this purpose; however, on occasion, an OV-1 or even UH-1H flew the mission. The aircraft was on station over the A Shau Valley at first light. The control aircraft directed traffic in and out of LZs, provided weather information, artillery advisories, hostile anti-aircraft positions and recommended approach and departure routes. In addition, the control ship vectored other aircraft to the various LZs in the valley, and during weather days (nearly every day), vectored other aircraft to holes in the cloud deck.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That this technique be published for other units to use.

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D. Using FADAC without power transfer table.

- (1) OBSERVATION: There have been several instances where FADACs have been down due to inoperative FADAC Tables.
- (2) EVALUATION: The FADAC Table is necessary only to program and test FADAC. Once the program has been entered, the computer can be used minus the table.
- (3) RECOMMENDATION: Once the FADAC has been programed and tested, it should continue to be used if the power transfer table becomes inoperative.

E. Operations with units unfamiliar with aerial rocket artillery (ARA).

- (1) OBSERVATION: Coordination and control of ARA fires present a problem when supported units are unfamiliar with ARA operations.
- (2) EVALUATION: It has been found that ground controllers from units other than those organic to 1 ACD do not understand ARA employment. They expect the aircraft to fly a low, armed reconnaissance type run which would enable the pilot to distinguish between friendly elements and enemy troops as the firing run is made. When close and discrete ARA are desired, positive marking of all friendly elements must be accomplished.
- (3) RECOMMENDATION: Prior to planned operations with units other than those of 1 ACD, liaison should be effected to orient advisors, artillery liaison officers and forward observers concerning the employment of ARA. When this is not feasible due to operational requirements, 1 ACD Circular 525-18, "Employment of Aerial Rocket Artillery," dated 15 Jul 68, should be distributed to units prior to operations.

F. Stay-behind daylight ambushes.

- (1) OBSERVATION: When units return to a FOB at the end of the day, the enemy often follows and conducts sniper activities.
- (2) EVALUATION: The enemy has been habitually using sniper activities during the hours just prior to darkness against companies returning to their FOBs. By establishing daylight ambushes as the company moves, we have been successful in combating ambushes of this nature.
- (3) RECOMMENDATION: That the company returning to its FOB establish stay-behind daylight ambushes along the way.

G. M-79 shotgun rounds.

- (1) OBSERVATION: The use of the M-79 shotgun round in canopy jungle has been more effective than the M-79 HE round.

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(2) EVALUATION: In areas where the jungle growth is dense, the M-79 HE round was not as effective as it should be because of the obvious obstacles in the area. The M-79 shotgun was very effective at short ranges in view of the obstacles made by dense vegetation.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the use of the M-79 shotgun round in dense foliage be emphasized through wide dissemination as an effective weapon for close in contact in jungles.

H. Command detonated mines.

(1) OBSERVATION: The enemy continues to employ command detonated mines in conjunction with conventional mine warfare.

(2) EVALUATION: Command detonated mines continue to be a source of difficulty for mine sweep teams. Often a mine wired for command-detonation is detected and preparations are made to destroy it. Then the enemy activates the device, seriously wounding or killing friendly soldiers. In other instances a small device is detected and destroyed. When personnel gather around the resultant crater to assess the damage, a nearby command detonated mine is activated to cause casualties.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Supervisors of mine sweep teams must insure that a vigorous search for wires and enemy personnel is conducted during sweep operations.

I. Destruction of enemy mines.

(1) OBSERVATION: Whenever mines or other metallic objects are discovered during mine sweep operations, the current policy is to destroy in place.

(2) EVALUATION: This practice usually results in a large crater, even when no mine is present and requires use of engineer equipment to reopen the road. Small diameter shaped charges have been made and tested for neutralization of mines detected on heavily travelled roads or hard-surfaced roads. The shaped charge is particularly useful in that if the metallic object is only a piece of metal debris rather than a mine, only a very small hole is made in the road surface. This requires little or no heavy equipment to repair. If, however, the object does contain explosives, the shaped charge detonates it, thus hastening clearing vital routes.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That use, test and evaluation of this home-made device continue toward perfecting the design and use as a standard item in mine sweep operations.

J. Penetrator distributor on forward operating bases.

(1) OBSERVATION: Lack of adequate equipment to spread dust palliative on forward firebases causes dangerous operating conditions for helicopters bringing in food, water, ammunition, and other replacement or resupply items.


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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

(1) OBSERVATION: Lack of adequate equipment to spread dust palliative on forward firebases causes dangerous operating conditions for helicopters bringing in food, water, ammunition and other replacement or resupply items.

(2) EVALUATION: Until recently, there were several methods, all of which are less than satisfactory, of spreading peneprime. One was to break a barrel and roll it along the ground. A second method has been to use 5-gallon cans. Finally, "mules" have been used to haul barrels that have been ruptured with a pick. None of these is effective in applying an even coat of peneprime to the helipad. A "TEE" has been improvised which fits the bung holes of a barrel. Its use has greatly improved peneprime distribution and allowed aviation safety on the forward firebase.



(3) RECOMMENDATION: That one of these "TEE's" be made for each engineer squad and included as a component item of the air assault kit.

K. Destroying booby traps while conducting Rome plow operations.

(1) OBSERVATION: Rome plow operations require a great deal of heavy equipment. In order to conduct this type of operation thoroughly, movement will be extremely slow and direction of movement is easily ascertained by the enemy.

(2) EVALUATION: This affords the enemy an opportunity to emplace booby traps throughout the area. These booby traps further impede the progress of the operation and have an obvious effect on troop morale. A point that cannot be overemphasized is the employment of every imaginable resource to clear booby traps and mines from the Rome plow area. Chemical air drops of JP4 fuel to burn out thickly vegetated areas and booby trap suspect areas along with air strikes, line charges, Bangalore torpedoes and grappling hooks are all excellent clearing techniques. Mine detectors are dangerous when used in heavily booby trapped and thickly foliated areas because they are more apt to trip a booby trap before it can be detected.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That maximum ingenuity be used to clear an area and detonate booby traps in advance of the main Rome plow effort. The following items are recommended for employment:

- (a) Rocket propelled line charges.
- (b) Bangalore torpedoes.
- (c) Armor sweeps in advance of Rome plow operations.
- (d) Fire drum drops.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

3. Training: None.

4. Intelligence: McQuire rig construction and method of delivery.

(1) OBSERVATION: The McQuire rig previously used for extracting personnel in areas where there were no LZs, were unsafe, difficult to ride and took too long to deliver to the ground.

(2) EVALUATION: A modified McQuire rig and method of delivery was developed, tested and used by Co E, 52d Inf (LRRP). The modification and new method of delivery proved very satisfactory. The time required for an individual to secure himself in the rig was cut approximately 8 seconds.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The McQuire rig and delivery technique shown in TAB F should be used instead of the old rig and delivery technique.

5. Logistics. Building materials.

(1) OBSERVATION: At many forward fire bases an ALOC is necessary for all supply. Materials for fighting bunkers and TOCs come in many components such as wood, wire, steel roof matting, and sand bags. The building of bunkers is time consuming and many times results in fortifications which are not properly constructed to afford maximum protection.

(2) EVALUATION: Building materials are generally in short supply. Some of the material that is obtained is wasted by inexperienced builders. Often the material is destroyed rather than moved when a unit moves. Simple pre-cut bunkers would greatly alleviate the problem of procuring materials and constructing bunkers.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That standard pre-cut bunkers be designed and made available to combat and combat support units in forward areas. The bunkers should be easy to assemble and disassemble and be retained by the units.

6. Organization: None.

7. Other: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

30 Incl
(See next page)

s/Conrad L. Stansberry
t/CONRAD L. STANSBERRY
COL, GS
Chief of Staff

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

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TAB A: Task Organization
TAB B: Weather and Terrain*
TAB C: Enemy Activities*
TAB D: Aerial Surveillance*
TAB E: Intelligence Activities
TAB F: McQuire Rig
TAB G: G-1 Activities*
TAB H: Unit Strengths*
TAB I: Casualty Report
TAB J: Replacement Report
TAB K: Unit Listing *
TAB L: Key Personnel Roster*
TAB M: Reenlistment/Promotion Statistics*
TAB N: Awards and Decorations*
TAB O: Special Services Activities*
TAB P: R&B Program*
TAB Q: Postal Activities*
TAB R: AER*
TAB S: Finance Activities*
TAB T: Surgeon's Activities
TAB U: Chaplain Activities*
TAB V: VIP Visits*
TAB W: Information Activities*
TAB X: Judge Advocate Activities*
TAB Y: Provost Marshal Activities*
TAB Z: Inspector General Activities*
TAB AA: G-4 Operations *
TAB AB: Logistics
TAB AC: Civil Affairs
TAB AD: Psychological Operations

DISTRIBUTION:

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*W/d Hq, DA

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AVIL-OCT (20 Aug 68) 1st Ind

MAJ Sanderson/jas/2506

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968,
RCS CS FOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV CORPS, APO 96308

11 OCT 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The OELL of the 1st Cav Div (AM) has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded IAW USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Concur with commander's recommendations noted at para 2A, 2F-H and 4, without further comment.

b. Item: Runway rehabilitation estimates, page 13, para 2B. The value of this information will be somewhat limited since correlation between ordnance, soil type and crater size is difficult on runways because of the heterogeneous nature of the runway structure. Tactical area base studies give indications of surface soil types in various locations, but the base course and sub-base profile of each airfield must be determined by on-site investigation.

c. Item: Air movement control aircraft, page 13, para 2C. Concur. O-1 and U-6 aircraft should be used as control aircraft as much as possible due to lower operating cost and longer time on-station. Recommend HQ, USARV disseminate this information to all major subordinate combat units to be included in their tactical SOPs.

d. Item: Using FADAC without power transfer table, page 13, para 2D. Concur. The table is not required for operations, including PROGRAM TEST of temporary and permanent storage, and determination that the computer is working properly. If problems arise which prove to be internal, then a table must be used. Connections between the FADAC and both the Signal Data Reproducer and the Computer Logic Test Set require use of the table, but these items are rarely needed and a table would normally be available from among the four authorized the three-battery battalions.

e. Item: Operations with units unfamiliar with aerial rocket artillery (ARA), page 13, para 2E. Concur.

(1) XXIV Corps Arty has addressed this problem by establishing an artillery forward observer/fire direction school. This school, which will begin in October and operate on a continuous basis, has ARA employment instruction included in the POI.

(2) An extract of this OELL concerning ARA and a copy of the 1st Cav Div Circular 525-18 has been sent to the 101st Abn Div (AM) for their use in planning ARA employment.

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AVII-GCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968,
RCS CS FOR-65 (R1) (U)

(3) The January 1968 Artillery Trends magazine contains an excellent article on organization, armament and employment of ARA. The article stresses the requirement to mark the observer's location and the necessity for the disposition of friendly elements to be provided to the ARA ships by the observer.

f. Item: Destruction of enemy mines, page 14, para 2I. Concur in principle of using shape charges, however, standard demolition containers MK1 MOD 0, MK2 MOD 0, and MK3 MOD 0, should be used in lieu of home-made containers for the explosive charge. Information on these containers is found in TM9-1375-200, Demolition Materials, pp 17, 18 and 23.

g. Item: Peneprime distributor on forward operating bases, page 15, para 2J. Concur. The fabricated "T" is a useful expedient, however, as the peneprime level in the drum drops, less coverage is attained due to the reduced cone of spray. A more uniform pressure is possible by incorporating a hand operated liquid transfer pump into the system. Further, a flexible hose with an appropriate nozzle and valve would provide access to areas not trafficable by the vehicle.

h. Item: Destroying booby traps while conducting Rome Flow operations, page 15, para 2K. Concur. A possible future improvement is a liquid explosive, certified by the Army and which is now being demonstrated in RVN. This explosive remains effective after seeping into the ground. It can be poured, sprayed or applied through a porous hose. It can be applied uniformly to an area and detonated by a small conventional explosive charge or HE round from a direct or indirect fire weapon. The resulting detonation should cause the sympathetic detonation of any mines or booby traps within the area of application. It will also clear the area of some vegetation.

i. Item: Building materials, page 16, para 5. Concur. The Division Engineer should be requested to design a series of bunkers which meet the requirements and make maximum use of available material.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 R Taylor
H. R. TAYLOR
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy Furn:
DA, ACSFOR
CG, 1st Cav Div (AM)

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AVHGC-DST (20 Aug 1968) 2d Ind MAJ Klingman/aja/LEN 4433
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 NOV 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning air movement control aircraft, page 13, paragraph 2c, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c. Concur with this concept as it was required under the very unusual circumstances encountered during operation Delaware/Lam Son 216. This procedure was presented to USAFV aviation commanders during a recent Aviation Seminar. The specialized nature of the requirement limits its applicability to other unit tactical SOP's.

b. Reference item concerning destruction of enemy mines, page 14, paragraph 2i, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2f. Concur with the recommendation contained in the 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2f.

c. Reference item concerning building material, page 16, paragraph 5, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2i. Concur with the recommendation contained in the 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2i.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

30 Incl
nc

W.C. Arntz
W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ XXIV Corps
HQ 1st Cav Div (AM)

GPOF-DT (20 Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)


HQ, US ARMY, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

7 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements
and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. J. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB A: Task Organization

1. On 1 May the task organization (maneuver battalions) of the 1st ACD was as follows:
 - a. 1st Bde
 - 1/8 Cav
 - 2/8 Cav
 - 1/12 Cav
 - b. 2d Bde (-) (OPCON 3d MAR DIV)
 - 1/5 Cav
 - 2/5 Cav
 - c. 3d Bde
 - 1/7 Cav
 - 2/7 Cav
 - 5/7 Cav
 - d. 196 Lt Inf Bde
 - 2/1 Inf
 - 3/21 Inf
 - 4/31 Inf
 - F Troop 17th Armored Cav
 - e. 3d ARVN Rept (Conducting joint operations in cooperation and coordination with 1 ACD)
 - 1/3 Bn, 2/3 Bn, 2/1 Bn
 - f. 1 ACD Control
 - 2/12 Cav
 - 1/9 Cav
2. On 1 May the 3/21 Inf released OPCON 196 LIB placed OPCON 3d MAR DIV.
3. On 6 May the 2/1 Inf released OPCON 196 LIB placed OPCON 101st Abn Div.
4. On 13 May the 196 LIB (-) released OPCON 1 ACD placed OPCON Americal Div.
5. 17 May:
 - a. 2d Bde (-) 1 ACD released 3d Marine Division; placed OPCON 1 ACD
 - b. 2/12 Cav released OPCON 1 ACD placed OPCON 2d Bde
 - c. 3/5 Armored Cav placed OPCON 1 ACD
6. 18 April the 3d ARVN Regiment with 2/1 Bn, 1/3 Bn and 2/3 Bn joined the 1 ACD to conduct joint operations in the Jeb. Stuart AO.
7. On 23 May 2/12 Cav Bn released OPCON 2d Bde placed OPCON 3d Bde 1 ACD.
8. 5 June:
 - a. C 1/8 Cav released OPCON 1st Bde placed OPCON 3d Mar Div.
 - b. A 3/5 Armored Cav released OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD, placed OPCON 3d Mar Div.
9. 12 June:
 - a. C 1/8 Cav released OPCON 3 MAR DIV placed OPCON 1st Bde 1 ACD
 - b. A 1/8 Cav released OPCON 1st Bde placed OPCON 3 Mar Div.
10. 17 June:
 - a. A 1/8 Cav released OPCON 3 Mar Div placed OPCON 1st Bde 1 ACD
 - b. D 1/9 Cav released OPCON 1 ACD placed OPCON 3d Mar Div
11. 20 June:
 - a. A 3/5 Arm Cav released OPCON 3 Mar Div placed OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD
 - b. C 3/5 Arm Cav released OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD placed OPCON 3d Mar Div
12. 27 June:
 - a. C 3/5 Arm Cav released OPCON 3d Mar Div placed OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD
 - b. D 1/9 Cav released OPCON 3 Mar Div placed OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD
13. On 28 June the 2/8 Cav was released OPCON 1st Bde 1 ACD placed OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968.
TAB A: Task Organization (Cont)

14. 10 July:
 - a. 2/12 Cav released OPCON 3d Bde 1 ACD placed OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD
 - b. 2/5 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde 1 ACD, placed OPCON 3d Bde 1 ACD
15. On 30 July, B 1/9 Cav released OPCON 1 ACD placed OPCON 101st ACD.
16. On 31 July, A 1/9 Cav released OPCON 1 ACD placed OPCON 1st Marine Division
17. On 31 July the task organization (Maneuver Battalions) of the 1st ACD were as follows:
 - a. 1st Bde
 - 1/8 Cav
 - 1/12 Cav
 - b. 2d Bde
 - 1/5 Cav
 - 2/8 Cav
 - 2/12 Cav
 - 3/5 Arm Cav
 - c. 3d Bde
 - 1/7 Cav
 - 2/7 Cav
 - 5/7 Cav
 - 2/5 Cav
18. On 31 July the task organization of the 3d ARVN Regt was as follows:
3d ARVN Regt (Conducting combined operations in cooperation and coordination with the 1 ACD.)
 - 1/3 Bn
 - 3/3 Bn
 - 4/3 Bn

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAF: C: Enemy Activities

1. Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216.

a. After initial enemy resistance was overcome and the 1st ACD and 3d ARVN Regt element occupied strategic positions in the A Shau Valley, enemy activity was primarily defensive, characterized by delaying actions in the large cache area west of A Luoi (L2 Stallion), stand-off attack against LZ's with mortars, and small scale engagements with friendly elements on search operations. Just prior to the extraction phase of the operation, the tempo increased with more stand-off attacks and small scale ground attacks in the northern part of the valley where 1 ACD elements were positioned astride the highway approach into the valley from the west. In addition to mortars, the enemy employed direct fire track-mounted weapons. During the final stages of the extraction the enemy shelled the remaining LZ's in the vicinity of A Luoi with mortars, 122mm, and 130mm Artv.

b. In general, the enemy avoided heavy ground contacts and there were no indications that the enemy planned to reinforce elements in the valley with additional combat troops.

c. Enemy units operating in the valley were under the overall command of the 559th Transportation Group. BT-7, subordinate to the 559th, was responsible for supply activities through the valley. The 5th Transportation Bn, under BT-7, was responsible for transportation and ground security. The 20th AA Regt was responsible for air defense and there was evidence of armor activity in the valley.

d. Flocking the valley and denying the enemy immediate reoccupation of the valley by extensive denial and barrier operations has probably resulted in the alteration or delay of any immediate large scale offensive designs in the Hue area.

e. The A Shau Valley is important to the enemy as a focal point of communication routes into the Thua Thien-Hue and Da Nang areas. It appears that supplies are stockpiled at various locations throughout the entire route running from North Vietnam through Laos and into various areas in SVN. It is probable that denying the enemy use of the A Shau Valley for a considerable period of time did affect his activities, however the loss of equipment to 1 ACD during Operation DELAWARE was not of such magnitude as to permanently hamper enemy operations to any great extent. Enemy losses in the A Shau Valley were:

KIA
NVA/VC
337/84

CAPTURED
NVA/VC
2/1

WEAPONS
INDIV/CS
2407/34

2. Operation JEB STUART III.

a. As units were extracted from the A Shau Valley, they initiated operations in Base Areas 101 and 114, and began to conduct rice denial operations in the coastal lowlands.

b. During the first part of May, the 803d Regiment, weakened by contacts northwest of Hue, moved to the Graveyard area. 1 ACD elements immediately began operating in the graveyard area to fix and destroy the enemy but did not make decisive contact.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB C: Enemy Activities (Cont)

c. During May, the 812th Regiment, with the mission of protecting the rice harvest in the Hai Lang area, operated in the My Chanh River area with the 6th Bn, and northwest in the vicinity of Quang Tri, with the 5th Bn. The 4th Bn stayed in Base Area 101. During the last week of May the 5th Bn, 812th Regiment, was trapped along the coast northeast of Quang Tri and suffered over 100 NVA KIA. Due to constant pressure exerted by the 1 ACD, the 812th Regiment appeared to be having problems in transporting rice to secure areas and coordinating the internal supply of subordinate battalions.

d. During May, in Base Area 114, 1st ACD and 3d ARVN Regiment elements attacked south but did not make heavy contact with the enemy, although numerous large bunker and hut complexes, command post areas, and two hospitals were found and destroyed.

e. Operations in Base Area 101 also resulted in the destruction of large base areas and bunker complexes with no heavy contact with large enemy forces. Enemy forces remaining in Base Area 101 were avoiding contact while the majority of forces usually operating in Base Area 101 were gathering rice.

f. During the first 10 days of June, the enemy continued interdiction efforts along Hwy 1 and rice gathering activities in the coastal plains while elements in Base Areas 101 and 114 harassed and delayed advancing 1 ACD elements with mortar attacks and small unit actions. During this period a propaganda station, several small weapons caches, and numerous hut, bunker, and tunnel complexes were found and destroyed in the Base Areas. The end of June was characterized by an increase in the number of Hoi Chanh, civil defendants detained, rice captured, and a decrease in road interdiction activities along Hwy #1 as 1st Cav elements, in conjunction with Regional and Popular Forces and National Police Field Forces, applied increasing pressure on the enemy in the coastal plains. Enemy units operating in Base Area 114 moved to the west-southwest as enemy elements in base Area 101 moved to the south to avoid contact with US forces.

g. Heavy enemy resistance was encountered during the middle of June in the southeastern portion of Base Area 114 as elements of the 303d NVA Regiment defied a large cache area against advancing elements of the 3d ARVN Regiment. The battle for the cache area continued with sporadic heavy contact through the 21st of June, resulting in much of the cache area destroyed by artillery and airstrikes. Large quantities of enemy ammunition including 122mm rockets were captured. Also during this period, 3d ARVN Regiment elements surrounded the 303d Regiment's anti-aircraft company, inflicting heavy damage, and entered the 303d Regimental HQ's bunker complex after overcoming stubborn resistance. South of the Base Area, 1st ACD elements entered a MUTH HQ bunker and tunnel complex and captured important maps and documents related to enemy activities from the DMZ south, to the Da Nang area. Captured maps revealed enemy construction of a road from the A Shau Valley to the vicinity of Base Area 114. Reaction to this information resulted in the destruction of five enemy trucks and numerous tents and bunkers. During June, enemy units in Base Area 101 continued harassing operations with stand-off mortar attacks and small scale engagements. Ambush, cordon, and search operations in the coastal plain concentrated in the Hai Lang and My Chanh River areas, continued to exert pressure on local infrastructure. On 18 June the enemy fired 122mm rockets at Camp

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB C: Enemy Activities (Cont)

Evans. 1 ACD reaction was swift and resulted in several NVA killed and one rocket captured. On the 19th of June 1st Cav elements captured the Assistant Proselyting Officer, 7th Front, who provided information confirming the 1 ACD analysis of the organization of the 7th Front. During this period it became evident that the majority of enemy forces in Base Area 11A were withdrawing to the west and the 7th Front Forces in Base Area 101 were concentrating in the southern part of the base area, while other elements of the 7th Front continued operations in the Trieu Phong Area and the coastal area northeast of Quang Tri City.

h. During the final part of the reporting period, the enemy continued to move westward from Base Area 11A and harass friendly elements with mortar, B-40 rocket attacks, and small unit actions. During this period additional 122mm rockets were captured by 3d ARVN Rest elements and a MTTTH Rear HQ area, including a communications cache, was found in Base Area 11A. Activity in Base Area 101 continued with the capture of a propaganda section HQ and a cache of surgical and medical supplies. The area of heaviest enemy activity was the southern and southeastern portions of the base area. Continuing enemy activity in the Trieu Phong Area was confirmed when 1st ARVN Rest elements made heavy contact with the 4th Bn, 812th Regiment, killing 129 enemy on 26 June. On 27 June 1st ACD elements in a two-day battle, destroyed major elements of the surrounded 814th Bn, 7th Front in Binh An Hamlet, northeast of Quang Tri City. 225 enemy were killed and 44 captured. Throughout the reporting period there has been an increase in the enemy's use of booby traps to hinder friendly movement.

i. During the first half of July, the enemy continued to offer resistance to allied operations threatening important installations in the base areas. The suspected construction of a road from the A Chau Valley toward Base Area 11A was confirmed by troops on the ground. The road was constructed in 30 ft segments. Five-foot stands of trees were left every 30 feet to provide excellent concealment from the air. During the early morning of 3 July the enemy responded to allied actions by conducting a coordinated attack on Landing Zone Miguel. After the attack on LZ Miguel, the enemy continued to offer sporadic resistance, which was principally directed against 3d ARVN Rest elements operating in the Eastern part of Base Area 11A. The 3d ARVN Rest captured and destroyed a large enemy ammunition cache on 23 July. Installations destroyed and caches uncovered in Base Area 11A during the first half of the month of July included a regimental-sized base area, a battalion-sized base area, one large and one small ammunition cache, and a communications cache.

j. During the first half of July, 1st ACD elements operating in the Southeastern portion of Base Area 101 met heavy resistance in several occasions. While operating in the vicinity of base and cache areas, a large bunker complex, a training area, and an ammunition cache were found.

k. Enemy operations in the coastal area were generally at procuring rice. The only heavy contact was initiated by the 1st ACD during a cordon operation East of Quang Tri. During this engagement, twenty-four enemy were killed.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB C: Enemy Activities (Cont)

1. During the second half of July, there was a noticeable increase in the enemy's employment of booby traps. During this period, the enemy employed anti-aircraft tactics which proved more effective than in the past, in limiting 1st ACD mobility during three separate heavy contacts. The tactic included the use of observation and firing positions in trees with emphasis on delivering fire on Logistics and Medevac helicopters to decrease the mobility and flexibility of ground troops operating in jungle areas. In the latter half of July, northwest of Base Area 114, a large hospital and a small weapons cache were found. To the south of Base Area 114, a large ammunition cache was uncovered which was depicted on a captured enemy map. Third ARVN Regiment units captured a large communications cache consisting of nineteen radios in Base Area 114. There were two heavy contacts during the latter part of the period to the northwest and the west of Base Area 114.

m. Expansion of operations in the vicinity of Base Area 114 included the construction of new fire bases to the south and west capable of interdicting the enemy communications route through the A Chau Valley.

n. In the southeastern part of Base Area 101, during a heavy contact with 1 ACD elements, the enemy employed the same anti-aircraft tactics used in the vicinity of Base Area 114. In the plains area northeast of Quang Tri, 1 ACD elements operating in conjunction with Popular Forces found several small weapons and rice caches.

o. There was scattered enemy activity in the My Chanh Bridge Area and in the Graveyard where Rome Flows are being used to clear areas historically used by the enemy for refuge.

p. As the reporting period closed, there were indications that the major portion of all units under the 7th Front were located in Base Area 101 and that the 7th Front were located to the southwest of the Base Area. Disposition of other enemy forces did not change radically during the reporting period. Most of the 803d Regt appears to have shifted to the west of Base Area 114, and non-tactical elements of MRTTH Headquarters have possibly displaced to the A Chau Valley. There are indications of increased enemy reconnaissance activity along the Bo River and in the vicinity of the An Lo Bridge. These activities correspond with reports of 803d Regiment attack plans.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB E: Intelligence Activities

1. 191st Military Intelligence Detachment.
 - A. Counterintelligence Operations (CI):
 - (1) Background Investigations:
 - a. Cases reviewed during reporting period: 10
 - b. Cases closed during reporting period: 10
 - c. Cases on hand at the end of the reporting period: 1
 - d. Cases processed past suspense date: 0
 - e. Leads completed: 23
 - (2) Security Services:
 - a. Announced Security Inspections: 21
 - b. Courtesy Inspections & Checks: 7
 - c. Unannounced Security Checks: 16
 - d. Unannounced Sanitary Fill Checks: 13
 - e. Fingerprinting: 111
 - f. Tech Services (locks, combination changes, etc.): 35
 - (3) Liaison Contacts:
 - a. Local GVI officials: 897
 - b. Military Officials: 1,065
 - c. Other intelligence units: 1,092
 - (4) Blacklist Personalities Screened: 8,169
 - (5) Interrogations:
 - a. NVA: 10
 - b. VC: 10
 - (6) Brightlight Reports: 19
 - (7) Collections:
 - a. Overt
 - (1) Spot Reports: 86
 - (2) Translations: 55
 - (3) Other Agency Reports: 2,553
 - b. Covert
 - (1) Spot Reports: 6
 - (2) Meetings: 54
 - (8) Personnel Security Activities:
 - a. Number of Validations: 2,455
 - (1) Top Secret: 277
 - (2) Secret: 2,168
 - b. Interim Clearances Granted: 24
 - (1) Interim TS: 4
 - (2) Interim Secret: 20
 - c. Cryptographic Access Granted: 103
 - (1) TS: 15
 - (2) S: 82
 - (3) C: 6
 - d. Requests for USAIRR Checks Submitted: 456
 - e. Local Files Checks Conducted: 5,537
 - f. Request for BI Submitted: 9
2. IPW: Operation DELAWARE-LAM SON 216:
 - A. Detainees: 21
 - (1) PW: 2
 - a. NVA: 1
 - b. VC: 1

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB E: Intelligence Activities (Cont)

- (2) Returnees: 0
- (3) IC: 13
- (4) CD: 6

B. Documents:

- (1) Batches: 33
- (2) Linear Inches: 342

3. IPW: Operation JEB STUART III

A. Detainees: 1363

- (1) PW: 166
 - a. NVA: 69
 - b. VC: 97
- (2) Returnees: 21
 - a. NVA: 6
 - b. VC: 15
- (3) IC: 845
- (4) CD: 331

B. Documents:

- (1) Batches: 131
- (2) Linear Inches: 674

C. 2d ARVN MI:

- (1) Detainees: 383
- (2) Documents Screened: 1016 inches

4. Division Radar Platoon (Provisional): The radar platoon is equipped with 8 radar sets. Three of the sets are the new AN/FPS-5, the other sets are the AN/FPS-4. The sets are located at LZ Long, LZ Sharon, a checkpoint on Hwy #1 and two sites on Camp Evans. At the end of the reporting period, 5 of the eight sets were operational.

5. Co E, 52d Inf (LRRP): During the reporting period, 61 Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols were dispatched. Emergency extractions were necessary on 23 of the missions run. Enemy casualties inflicted by the unit totaled 28 KIA (confirmed) and 8 KIA (probable). The teams sustained 5 friendly KIA and 4 friendly WIA (all in May) while making 98 separate enemy sightings. All missions were scheduled for at least 96 hours.

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
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB F: Procedure for Extraction by McQuire Rig once the Extraction Ship is over the team.

1. Position the aircraft directly over the team and descend to as low an altitude as the obstacles surrounding the pick-up point will permit.
2. Deliver the three McQuire Rigs on board the aircraft to the ground. Insure that the McQuire Rigs themselves are actually on the ground.
3. Procedure for team members to follow when hooking into the McQuire Rigs:
 - a. Release the sandbags.
 - b. Shake out all loops.
 - c. Step into the lower loops.
 - d. Snap the snap links, which are fastened to the sling ropes around the team members' chests, into the D-rings which are half way up the length of the rigs.
 - e. Once all personnel are securely fastened into the McQuire Rigs, all the personnel will look up at the aircraft.
4. Move straight up to an altitude which places all personnel riding in the McQuire Rigs at least 25' above all obstacles, and exit the pick up area at an air speed of no more than 70 knots.
5. Fly to a secure area.
6. Once over a suitable landing position within the secure area, come to a high altitude, hover, descend very slowly to the ground, and once all personnel riding in the McQuire Rigs are on the ground release all McQuire Rig connections from the aircraft.
7. Internally load all personnel and ropes in the aircraft, and return the LRRP team members to the LRRP base.

NOTE: The procedure for the second aircraft involved in the McQuire Rig is exactly the same as that outlined above for the first aircraft.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 July 1968
TAB F: McQuire Rig (Cont)



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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB I: Casualty Report

	<u>Casualties</u>			<u>Non Hostile</u>	
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>Death</u>	<u>Injury</u>
May	157	857	4	0	23
June	77	368	2	6	30
July	75	390	6	18	65

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB J: Replacement Report

Replacement Report for the period 1 May-31 July 1968

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>PI</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MAY	129	57	389	2319	2894
JUNE	187	78	320	1244	1829
JULY	<u>234</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>286</u>	<u>1335</u>	<u>1951</u>
TOTAL	550	231	995	4898	6674 Grand total

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
 TAB T: Surgeon's Activities

1. Medical

A. Disease and injury statistical data

(1) Non-battle injuries	582
(2) Disease	1297
a. Malaria	120
1. Vivax	45
2. Falciparum	74
3. Malariae	1
b. FUO	215
c. Psychiatric Cases	66
d. Others	1035
(3) Remaining in hospital (In country)	396

B. Discussion of Disease

(1) Malaria cases: A total of 120 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this division from 1 May 1968 to 31 July 1968, inclusive. Of these, 45 (38%) cases were due to Plasmodium vivax. The malaria incidence is as follows:

UNIT	MAY	JUNE	JULY	TOTAL
HHC 1st Bde	0	0	1	1
1/8	2	3	10	15
2/8	0	1	1	2
1/12	0	4	4	8
HHC 2d Bde	0	0	1	1
1/5	5	3	6	14
2/5	1	0	0	1
2/12	0	13	13	26
HHC 3d Bde	2	0	0	2
1/7	0	7	2	9
2/7	5	1	0	6
5/7	3	0	0	3
Div Arty	2	2	2	6
1/9	0	0	0	0
Avn Gp	0	2	4	6
Spt Cmd	0	2	5	7
Sig Bn	0	0	2	2
Engr Bn	0	0	1	1
HHC Div	1	0	1	2
LRRP	0	0	1	1
15 Admin	1	1	4	6
Other	0	0	1	1
Total	22	39	59	120

(2) Other selected diseases of importance:

Immersion Foot	1	Hepatitis	8
Heat Exhaustion	104	Dengue Fever	1
Poisoning	0	Infectious Meningitis	0
Animal Bites	2	Scrub Typhus	2

C. IRHA: From 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968, the 15th Medical Battalion treated a total of 1453 US Army personnel who were IRHA. Of these, 1077 were admitted and 376 were CRO.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
 TAB AB: Logistics

1. (C) Supply and Services:

- a. Class I Activities. The average daily tonnage of Class I issued decreased from 50 STON's to 48 STON's during the period.
- b. Class II and IV activities. The average daily tonnage of Class II and IV issued increased from 37 to 38 STON's during the period.
- c. Class III activities. The average daily issues of Class III decreased from 110,763 gals to 103,228 gals during the period.
- d. Class V activities. The average daily tonnage of Class V issued decreased from 204 STON's to 202 STON's during the period.
- e. Food service activities. Food service personnel continued to perform inspections (total 17) throughout the division. Primary effort was afforded technical assistance (total 152) due to the realignment of Brigade and Battalion LZ's. The technical assistance visits were geared toward assistance in setting up field messes in new areas and care to avoid food spoilage.
- f. Aerial supply activities. Rigger personnel continued to assist at each Brigade trains area with the sling loading for resupply of company and battalion fire bases. Other activities included the successful field recovery of several helicopters, missions of breakaway fuel drop and technical inspection of air items for division and non-division units. Total tonnage rigged was 11,787 STON's.

g. The following supplies were issued during the period:

(1) Class I

- (a) A Rations: 632.7 STON
- (b) B Rations: 906.0 STON
- (c) C Rations: 1,422,008 meals
- (d) Ice: 12,543.0 STON
- (e) Milk: 56.41 STON
- (f) Sundry Packs: (Not available)
- (g) LRRP Rations: 225,452 meals

(2) Class II AND IV.

- (a) Clothing and equipment issued: 3,063.6 STON
- (b) Fortification material issued: 122.4 STON

(3) Class III

- (a) AVGAS 171,344 gal 4,468.93 STON
- (b) JP-4 4,322,350 gal 13,159.56 STON
- (c) MCGAS 1,273,563 gal 5,463.83 STON
- (d) DF-2 1,098,472 gal 3,455.60 STON
- (e) Packaged Products 379.26 STON

(4) Class V

Ammunition issued: 10,011.32 STON

2. (C) Transportation and Maintenance

a. Air Transportation. Significant movements during the period were as follows:

TYPE	Date	Unit	Orig	Dest	Type A/C	Cargo	Pax	Sorties
CE	2-5	3d Bde	Unk	A Lucid	C-130	1.6 S/T	0	1
CE	4-5	3d Bde	Unk	A Lucid	C-130	34.5 S/T	0	10
CE	5-5	3d Bde	Unk	A Lucid	C-130	140.2 S/T	0	29
CE	6-5	3d Bde	Unk	A Lucid	C-130	257.0 S/T	0	18
CE	7-5	3d Bde	Unk	A Lucid	C-130	98.0 S/T	0	7
CE	9-5	3d Bde	A Lucid	CE	C-130	56.0 S/T	0	10
CE	10-5	3d Bde	A Lucid	CE	C-130	0	630	5
CE	12-5	3d Bde	A Lucid	CE	C-130	138.0 S/T	16	12

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
 TAB AB: Logistics (Cont)

Type	Date	Unit	Orig	Dest	Type A/C	Cargo	Pax	Sorties
01	15-6	1/30 AT	AK	DNG	C-130	9.0 S/T	10	1
01	17-6	DISCO	ON	Phu Bai	C-130	6.0 S/T	0	1
01	16-7	DISCO	ON	CE	C-130	10.5 S/T	0	1
01	17-6	DISCO	ON	CE	C-130	35.0 S/T	0	4
01	26-6	DISCO	ON	CE	C-130	40.0 S/T	0	2

b. Aerial Resupply

Date	Sorties	Weight	Class Supplies
1-5	27	378 S/T	I, III, V
2-5	13	182 S/T	I, V
3-5	17	238 S/T	I, III, V
4-5	14	186 S/T	I, V

c. SEA (USAF) Air Lift and Courier Service. A daily C-130 flight continues round trip service to An Khe, Camp Evans, Quang Tri, Camp Evans, An Khe and Cam Ranh Bay. Replacements were moved from An Khe to Camp Evans and Quang Tri. DTRCS and R&R personnel were moved from Quang Tri and Camp Evans to An Khe and Cam Ranh Bay. Eight C-7A aircraft continued dedicated service to the 1 ACD Haulin cargo and passengers as needed.

d. Ground Transportation. The division required no augmentation of ground transportation during the period. The transportation units of the 26th GS Group continued to provide haul from 26th GS Group supply points to the brigade bases.

e. Ground Maintenance. Average operational readiness by item type for the period was as follows:

Category	% Operational
Vehicles	95.8
Trailers	99.7
Artillery	99.5
Small Arms	99.6
Generators	88.6
Communications	93.3
Office Machines	96.0
AVERAGE	96.0

3. (C) Aircraft Maintenance. Average statistics by type aircraft during the reporting period were as follows:

Acraft	Assigned Acraft	Avg NORMS	Avg NORM	Ave Mission Ready
OH-6A	57	5	35	60
OH-13S	31	8	29	63
UH-1B	29	8	30	62
UH-1C	29	6	33	61
UH-1D	3	0	23	77
JUH-1D	3	4	23	73
UH-1F	163	5	27	68
H-1G	39	6	27	67
CH-47A	32	3	40	57
CH-47B	16	5	29	66
CH-54A	9	12	18	70
O-1G	4	0	17	83
O-1D	4	2	13	84
OV-1B	2	3	28	69
OV-1C	3	11	23	66
U-6A	1	5	25	70

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB AB: Logistics

4. (C) Support provided by 1st Log Command.

a. General. The Da Nang Support Command of the 1st Log Command continued to support the 1st Air Cavalry Division through the 26th GS Group at Quang Tri. The 26th GS Group continued to operate a FSA at Camp Evans and to provide FSA type services at LZ Sharon. No FSA was provided for the 2d Brigade at LZ Jane. Supplies were thru-put from Wunder Beach and services were provided from FSA at 1st Brigade, LZ Sharon.

b. Transportation continued to be provided, through the transportation units of the 26th GS Group, for transport from 1st Log Comd supply points to brigade LZ's. The 26th Group also provided the transport for PX supplies from Quang Tri to Camp Evans.

c. Services to the 1st Air Cavalry Division were provided from the 26th GS Group to each brigade of the division. Services included laundry, bath, EOD and graves registration. A major problem area has been the service time for laundry support at Camp Evans. On occasions it has taken as long as 8-10 days for a unit to receive its laundry back from the FSA laundry detachment. One contributing factor to this lack of adequate support has been the excessive machine maintenance time. The 26th GS Group is attempting to resolve this problem by establishing contract laundry service at Camp Evans to augment the laundry detachment. This service is presently scheduled to become operational about 18 Aug 68.

d. Supply:

(1) Class I. Of significant importance has been the increase in the quantity of ice received each day. Due to the limited number of refrigerators, it has been extremely important that maximum ice necessary to cool perishable foods and liquids be received each day. The amount of ice received for this period has increased from 1 lb per man per day to 2.5 lbs per man per day. Also the 26th GS Group installed an 1800 cu ft freezer at Camp Evans Class I point which will somewhat improve the storage situation for perishables.

(2) Class II and IV. Primarily through the efforts of the 15th S&S Bn, arrangements were made with the 26th GS Group, Naval Supply Activity, Da Nang, and Qui Nhon Depot for shipment and receipt by this division of large quantities of sandbags, 8 foot pickets, concertina, lumber and bunker materials. These materials were required for construction of a new brigade base at LZ Nancev and improvements of the current facilities.

(3) Class III. The Class III support provided by the 26th GS Group has been adequate with no significant problems encountered.

(4) Class V. The stockage objective limitations at the Camp Evans ASP, and occasional zero balances of certain types of ammunition at Quang Tri and Wunder Beach have caused difficulties. The division has experienced shortages of stockages items such as 81mm illuminating, 155mm Smoke, aircraft flares and smoke grenades (assorted colors). During the period these shortages did not affect mission requirements of this division.

(5) TO&E Equipment shortages. The following significant shortages of equipment existed at the end of the period.

<u>Item</u>	<u>No. Short</u>
M-79, Grenade Launcher	138
PRC-25, Radio	66
RT-292, Antenna	125
PFS-5, Radar Set	16
Truck, 1/2 Ton	169
UH-1D/H, Helicopter	22*
AH-1G, UH-1B/C, Helicopter	8

*Fill level reduced on 13 May from 197 to 175. 3 each are UH-1D and 3 each are UH-1B.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB B: Logistics

5. Facilities

a. Projects completed. During the period the Post Chapel and sheds and storage shelters, destroyed by the explosion of the ASP, were rebuilt. The Commanders Mess and a Division Training Center were also completed.

b. Project under construction. During the period construction of a new 3 module (5 pads per module) ASP began. Additionally 26 of the 50 tent frames and huts, destroyed by the explosion of the ASP, were completed.

c. Planned projects. It is planned to upgrade the present airfield, through work to be accomplished by MCB4, by installation of an all-weather surface. Planning for minimum essential requirements construction was completed and approval obtained to proceed on Camp Evans and two brigade base camps. Work on these projects are scheduled to begin in August 1968.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB AC: Civil Affairs

1. Population and resources control.

a. Refugees: Only one large scale refugee operation was conducted during the reporting period in the Division AO. These refugees came in two moves, the first consisting of 677 families and the second consisting of 317 families, with a total of 4388 people. 144 of these families remained in the Chi Dong Hamlet (Coord YD 6442), Phong Dien District. CORDS provided tin and cement for the construction of 28 family units 18m long x 6m wide. However, completion was delayed due to lack of bamboo. Constant surveillance and help was given by this Division at every opportunity.

b. Rice evacuated: Total rice evacuated during the reporting period was 393 tons. This rice was taken to Phong Dien, Huong Dien, Hai Lang, and Mai Linh Districts.

c. Security control: Many hamlets within the Phong Dien District placed concertina wire around their hamlets to provide better security at night.

2. (U) Civic Action.

a. The civic action program continued to expand with approved laundry facilities operating at all the Rde's LZ's. These laundries were checked frequently by the Rde S-5's.

b. Civic action projects within the Division AO continued. However, these were short term, high impact projects. Vietnamese participation in actual project work increased immensely with the Division providing technical and material assistance.

c. MEDCAPS continued to be the backbone of the Division's program. During the reporting period, 351 MEDCAPS were conducted, and a total of 32,041 patients were treated.

d. 36,107 pounds of food, 2000 pounds of clothing and 3,966 pounds of soap were equally distributed to needy families and orphanages.

e. The SJA and G-5 worked an agreement to make solatium payments whenever possible within 24 hours of notification of an incident involving innocent civilians.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB AD: Psychological Operations

1. Psychological Operations

a. General: PSYOPS were conducted in support of combat operations to induce defection and disaffection among the NVA/VC forces and encourage popular support for the Government of South Vietnam. PSYOP supported rice denial operations throughout the Division AO. During the period 1-17 May 68, PSYOP were conducted in support of DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 with emphasis in the A Shau Valley. An intensive Chieu Hoi campaign was conducted vicinity of the A Shau Valley and directed solely at the NVA. A campaign to explain good treatment to PW's was also conducted. In the AO vicinity LZ Evans and LZ Jane psychological operations were directed at NVA/VC forces and the civilian population along QL-1. Themes included were the Chieu Hoi program and civilian rewards program. A campaign was initiated to exploit the peace initiative taken by President Johnson. Targets included both friendly and enemy audiences. During JED STUART III psychological operations were initiated in close support of rice denial operations. Campaign directed at NVA/VC forces included good treatment of PW's and the Chieu Hoi Program. Shortage of food in Base Area 101 and inadequate medical treatment were exploited during the month of June. The civilian population was targeted to induce them to support GVN, participate in the rewards program, and withhold support of the VC/NVA. Exploitation of the peace talks continued. PSYOP supported operations to control inland waterways in the Division AO. Leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts emphasized restricted areas and curfew hours.

b. Support:

(1) The 9th Air Commando flew 2875 and 3740 tape and leaflet missions requested. Using O2B and C-47 PSYOP aircraft, 100,941,400 leaflets were dropped, and 293 hrs loudspeaker appeal time were broadcast.

(2) The 7th PSYOP Bn located at Da Nang provided printing and tape support, one HB Team to each Brigade, and liaison with the 9th ACS. The quality of printing was good.

(3) Each HB Team provided PSYOP support using a 250 watt ground loudspeaker and a 1000 watt loudspeaker mounted on an HH-1 helicopter. The Brigade teams broadcast 405 hrs. ground loudspeaker time, 77 hrs heliborne loudspeaker time, and disseminated 161,500 leaflets, 17,450 JI'SPAO newspapers, and 1,125 rewards posters. The HB teams exploited Hoi Chanhs by employing both heliborne and ground loudspeaker broadcasts.

(4) Armed Propaganda Teams were employed with the Brigades during July. APT's were obtained from the Chieu Hoi Centers in Hue and Quang Tri City. These Teams were used with the HB Teams in populated areas to enhance face-to-face persuasion. APT's are not effectively employed on such operations as cordon and search.

2. Chieu Hoi Program:

a. During the period 17 May - 21 June, a successful rice denial operation was conducted in Huong Dien District by elements of the 3d Bde working with Popular Forces. The 3d Bde HB Team supported the operation with ground and heliborne broadcasts, emphasizing the Chieu Hoi program in appeals directed at the local VC Guerrillas. The District S-2 reported receiving thirty VC ralliers during the period, and elements of the 2d Bn, 7th Cav received one NVA.

b. The 3d Bde initiated Rome Flow operations in portions of Phong Dien and Quang Dien Districts during July, and this operation also produced ralliers. Six VC ralliers were received by 2d Bn, 7th Cav during the period 23-26 July, and an undetermined number rallied to GVN officials in Quang Dien District.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
TAB AD: Psychological Operations (Cont)

Phong Dien District reported receiving 14 ralliers during the month of July, with 11 VC rallying during the period 12-29 July.

c. Total number of returnees during May, June, and July throughout the Division AO was 118. A majority of the returnees reported to District officials. Although only twenty of these rallied to elements of the Division, the large number of returnees was a direct result of successful combat/psychological operations by the 1st Air Cav Div, particularly in the populated coastal plains.

3. Civilian Rewards Program: Although the Voluntary Informant Program (Civilian Rewards) had been continuously emphasized by the Bde PSYOP Teams since the Division moved into the ICTZ in January 1968, this campaign had met with little success until 22 July. On that date, the 1st Bde PSYOP Team working with the Bde S-2 and 191st MI Team made a rewards payment for munitions turned in by Vietnamese civilians. In this case, a one-half pound block of TNT was turned in by a Vietnamese boy. From 22 July until the end of the reporting period six more payments were made by the 1st Bde. Additional munitions turned in included 7 Chicom grenades, one M-26 grenade, two 60mm mortar rounds, and one R-40 rocket round. All of these payments were made in the vicinity of Quang Tri City.

4. Kit Carson Scouts: In early May only 25 KCS were assigned to the Division. During this reporting period 34 KCS were trained and assigned to combat units. Kit Carson Scout candidates were obtained from Hue Chieu Hoi Center. They were employed with the infantry companies and the Blue Teams and "D" Troop, 1/9 Cav. At the end of the reporting period 62 KCS were assigned to the Division and three were in training. Their employment continued to be effective.